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Abstract
We model parental sex selection and the equilibrium sex ratio. With intrinsic son
preference, sex selection results in a male-biased sex ratio. This is ine¢ cient, due to
a marriage market congestion externality. Medical innovations that facilitate selection
increase ine¢ ciency. If son preference arises endogenously, due to population growth
causing an excess of women on the marriage market, selection may improve welfare.
These results are robust to allowing prices or intra-household transfers in a frictional
market. We analyze the e¤ects of sex ratio imbalances on parental investments, the
e¤ect of fertility on sex selection and concerns for family gender balance.
JEL Categories: J12, J13, J16
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In many parts of the world, parents exhibit gender bias, and prefer to have sons. This
phenomenon is especially prevalent in South and East Asia. In Northern India, it is common
to celebrate the birth of a boy and bemoan that of a girl. The community of hijras (eunuchs),
who make their living by extorting money on joyous occasions such as the birth of a child,
demand substantially larger amounts when the child is male. Gender bias is reected in
male biased sex ratios, and the problem of "missing women" (Sen, 1990), a problem that
was already noted in the rst Indian census of 1871. Historically, sex ratio imbalances have
been attributed to the relative neglect of girls, but in extreme cases, infanticide has also been
practised. In Dharmapuri district of Tamil Nadu, India, infant girls were often fed uncooked
rice, as a way of inducing rapid death. In Punjab (northern India), the caste of Bedi Sikhs
have traditionally been known as kudi-maar "girl-killer".1
Modern medicine has aggravated the problem by facilitating selection for boys. The
development and spread of amniocentesis and ultrasound screening in the early 1980s made
foetal sex determination possible, permitting sex selective abortion. Sex selective abortion
is illegal in China and India, but the practice ourishes. It is hard to see how such a law
can be enforced given that neither ultrasound nor abortions are illegal, so that sex selective
abortion is unveriable. These technological developments have been associated with a
rapid increase in the sex ratio at birth in East/South Asia, from its usual norm of 105-106
boys per 100 girls. In the Indian census of 2001 the sex ratio in the age group 0-6 was 107.8,
with some northern states such as Punjab having ratios as high as 120-125 (Bhaskar and
Gupta, 2007). In the 2000 Chinese census, the sex ratio in the age group 0-4 was 120.2, with
some regions reporting ratios of 130-135. These trends are mirrored in other Asian countries
such as South Korea and Taiwan, which have sex ratios at birth of 108 and 109 respectively.
The large increases in the sex ratios across censuses are most plausibly due to the spread of
sex selection techniques.2
The marriage market consequences of these sex ratio imbalances are enormous. Our
empirical estimates suggest that in China, one in four boys in recently born cohorts will be
without brides, raising fears of social disruption and instability. This raises the question, how
can such imbalances persist? Asian parents may prefer boys to girls, but surely evolution
has also endowed them with a strong desire for grandchildren. Can such sex ratios be an
equilibrium phenomenon, or do they reect myopia on the part of parents? These trends also
raise the normative question, should we allow parental sex selection? The standard response,
from governments, international agencies, and non-governmental organizations, is to deplore
1See Dasgupta (1987) on discrimination in the Punjab.
2For aggregate estimates of the extent of sex selective abortions in India, see Arnold et al. (2002) and
Jha et al. (2006). Portner (2009) uses micro data on birth spacing in India to estimate the hazard rates of
having a boy and a girl.
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sex selection, since this reects discriminatory preferences, that are based on ignorance and
backwardness. Rather than allowing choice based on such preferences, the state has a duty
to educate away such preferences. This view is squarely paternalistic, and policy is not based
upon the preferences of citizens, but on those of enlightened agencies.
An alternative view, that is less common, is that sex selection may improve the position
of girls, by raising their value as they become scarce. Dharma Kumar (1983) was an early
and trenchant proponent of this position. She asked whether selective abortions are any
worse than the neglect and infanticide of girl children, and argued that market forces will
alleviate problems arising from discriminatory preferences. However, this view does not take
into account possible externalities or market failure.
There is an enormous empirical literature on the subject of the sex ratio. Following
Amartya Sen (1990) and many demographers (e.g. Coale, 1991), economists are increasingly
contributing to this debate (see Oster, 2005; Qian, 2008; Anderson and Ray, 2009). However,
there is very little in terms of formal economic analysis of the social implications of sex ratio
imbalances arising from sex selection. Edlund (1999) examines the e¤ects of sex selection
in a nite and hierarchically ordered society. However, her work does not examine welfare
issues, and does not address the congestion externalities and possible market failures that lie
at the heart of the present paper.3 Following R.A. Fisher (1930), biologists have examined
models of equilibrium sex ratios; however, evolutionary models do not allow for any concerns
apart from long run genetic representation, and do not deal with welfare issues.
Section 1 of this paper proposes a model of parental choice and the equilibrium sex ratios
in order to address these issues. An imbalance in the sex ratio is an equilibrium consequence
of gender biased preferences. At an equilibrium, the payo¤ di¤erence between having a boy
as compared to a girl will be lower than in the absence of choice. This is mainly done by
reducing the payo¤ to having a boy, from reduced marriage market prospects; the payo¤
to having a girl also rises, but to a smaller extent. In consequence, parents who select for
boys exert a congestion externality in the marriage market. Sex selection reduces welfare,
where welfare is evaluated in terms of the ex ante expected utility of the typical parent.
Technological improvements in selection that facilitate sex selection will worsen the sex ratio
and reduce welfare. Our policy recommendation is a Pigouvian subsidy to girls, that is
nanced by a tax on boys this results in a Pareto improvement.
Our conclusions are di¤erent if intrinsic gender bias is absent or mild, and if the observed
preference for boys arises endogenously, from the fact that girls nd it hard to marry. This
may arise due to the marriage squeeze the e¤ective excess supply of girls in the marriage
3In section 4 we discuss sex selection in a class society, and in this context, we discuss Edlunds work in
greater detail.
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market, due to population growth and the fact that men marry younger women. If population
growth causes an excess supply of girls, and there is little intrinsic gender bias, then sex
selection may improve welfare. Thus, the answer to the question, does sex selection raise or
reduce welfare depends upon empirical evidence. In China, census data shows that cohort
sizes are falling rapidly, so there is reverse marriage squeeze, and a large excess supply of
boys. Thus selection for boys is unambiguously welfare reducing. In India, the picture is
more mixed. Cohort sizes are growing, and the marriage squeeze counteracts the marriage
market consequences of biased sex ratios. There is an excess supply of boys in the North-
West of India, and in this region, sex selection appears to be welfare reducing; however,
elsewhere in the country, there is still an excess supply of girls on the marriage market.
The results of our model are robust to various extensions. As Angrist (2002) and Chiap-
pori et al. (2002) show, an excess of males on the marriage market will raise the bargaining
power of women and shift household allocations in their favour. Since parents are altruistic,
this will make it more attractive for them to have girls rather than boys. Such distributional
e¤ects will reduce the magnitude of sex ratio imbalances, but our qualitative conclusions con-
tinue to hold. We show this in section 2, in a model where intra-household allocations are
negotiated in marriage markets that are subject to search frictions. With large gender bias,
the equilibrium sex ratio is excessively biased towards boys from a social welfare standpoint,
and technological progress reduces welfare by aggravating the congestion externality.
Imbalances in the sex ratio also di¤erentially a¤ect parents incentives to invest in boys as
compared to girls. In section 3 we examine the joint determination of sex ratios and parental
investments. This requires a modication of the model of parental investments due to Peters
and Siow (2002), since equilibrium fails to exist in their model once we allow for sex selection.
Our analysis shows that a male biased sex ratio causes ine¢ ciencies in investments there
is over-investment in boys relative to the rst best, and under-investment in girls. However,
if the social planner can ensure a balanced sex ratio (e.g. via a tax-subsidy scheme), then
investment decisions will also be e¢ cient. We also extend our model to consider a variety
of other issues. In section 4 we consider how the incentive to select varies endogenously
across social groups, so that selection decisions in upper classes will a¤ect incentives in
poorer sections. In section 5 we analyze the e¤ects of fertility and family composition upon
selection decisions. This provides a theoretical basis for understanding the e¤ects of fertility
decline (e.g. due to Chinas one-child policy) on the sex ratio.
In section 6 we consider developed societies where family gender balancing is a primary
motivation. Sex selection is increasingly possible via "acceptable" technologies, such in vitro
fertilization or preconception gender selection. Sex selection may improve individual utility;
however, even if family balancing is the primary motive, a congestion externality may arise if
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preferences are not fully symmetric between the sexes, or if the costs of selection are gender
dependent. Thus society must ensure that incentives are provided to ensure gender balance
at the aggregate level. The nal section concludes. The appendix provides details of the
formal proofs that are not dealt with in the body of the paper.
1 The Basic Model
The standard biological model of the sex ratio dates back to R.A Fisher (1930), following
on ideas in Darwin. Fishers model is one where a parent is concerned only with maximizing
reproductive tness, and predicts a balanced sex ratio. In equilibrium, there is no gender bias
parents are equally happy when a girl is born as when a boy is. However, human societies
have been transformed enormously from the times of hunter-gatherers when evolutionary
preferences were shaped. With increased life expectancy, children are an important source
of support in old age. Thus the economic value of o¤spring, beyond considerations of genetic
representation, is also important. Di¤erent agricultural technologies a¤ord varying roles for
the sexes. Boserup (1970) argued that the superior status of women in sub-Saharan Africa
relative to Asia was attributable to their greater utility in hoe-cultivation as compared to
plough-cultivation. Bardhan (1974) attributes the higher status of women (and favorable sex
ratios) in rice-growing south India, relative to wheat-growing north India, to the fact that
rice has greater use for female labor than wheat. More recently, Qian (2008) investigates the
e¤ects of the change in gender specic earnings caused by the Chinese economic reforms, that
raised the returns to female labor in tea growing regions, and to male labor in regions with
orchard fruit. She nds signicant inter-regional changes in the sex ratio that are associated
with regional cropping patterns.
Cultural factors may also reinforce son preference. For Hindus, a son is deemed essential,
since it is he who must light the funeral pyre. Confucianism assigns a pivotal role to the son-
father relationship. Economists may seek deeper explanations for these cultural phenomena;
however, these historically given preferences play a role in determining current behavior.
These considerations suggest that while concerns of reproduction are important, the
economic (and cultural) value of o¤spring is also relevant. Accordingly, we modify Fishers
model by allowing parents to have preferences directly regarding the gender of their child.
Our primary focus is on the e¤ects of "gender-bias" in preferences, possibly arising from
di¤erences in economic value of the sexes, although we also investigate "family-balancing"
concerns in sections 5 and 6. To this end, we assume that parental preferences are such that
a boy is preferred to a girl, conditional on both having the same marital status. However,
a married girl is strictly preferred to a single boy. Since marriage is uncertain, we need
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to consider preferences over lotteries, and we parameterize the von-Neumann Morgenstern
utilities as follows. Let uB be the base payo¤ to the parents from having a single boy,
and let uG be the base payo¤ from having a girl. We assume that each boy is ex ante
identical; however, his quality in the marriage market is random and equals G + "; where
G > 0 and " has a continuous density on support [0; "]: Thus, any girl has a payo¤ G from
marriage, and the term " reects the idiosyncratic quality of her partners quality. Similarly,
all girls are ex ante identical, and her realized quality equals B + ; where B > 0 and
 has a continuous density on support [0; ] with the same mean as ". We assume that
the idiosyncratic component of match value is small relative to the systematic component 
this is stated precisely as Assumption A1. Assume that uB + B  uG + G for most of
the paper, we assume that this inequality is strict i.e. there is son preference. Furthermore,
we shall assume that a married girl is always preferred to a single boy i.e. uB < uG + G:
We assume that the quality of the child cannot be observed at conception (although gender
can), but only later, on the marriage market. We also assume that parents evaluate matches
in the same way that their o¤spring do.
We now turn to supply and demand in the marriage market, which depend not only
on the sex ratio but also upon the rate of growth in birth cohort size. This is due to
the fact that men are, on average, older than their wives. Data from the United Nations
(1990) documents that this is true in each of over 90 countries, in each time period (between
1950 and 1985) that data is available. While an age gap at marriage may not cause any
imbalances in a stationary population, it has major social consequences when cohort sizes
are increasing over time, since each cohort of men is matched with a larger cohort of women.
The consequent excess supply of women has been called themarriage squeeze, and it weakens
womensposition on the marriage market. Demographers, such as Bhatt and Halli (1999),
have argued that the marriage squeeze is responsible for the deterioration of the position
of women in India, and replacement of the institution of bride price in many regions and
communities by dowries (payment from the brides family to the groom). Let g be the
rate of growth of cohort size, and let r be the sex ratio at birth (of girls relative to boys).
Let  be the age gap at marriage, assumed to be exogenous  on page 9 we discuss the
implications of endogenizing  . To simplify notation, let  = (1 + g) :Thus the ratio of
women to men in the marriage market, r; is related to the sex ratio at birth, r; by the
equation r = r: For expositional simplicity, we shall assume positive growth, so that   1
the implications negative growth are easily inferred from our analysis.4 Given population
growth, our analysis focuses on a dynamic steady state equilibrium, where the sex ratios at
4This is realistic for most developing countries, except China, where cohort sizes appear to be falling, due
to the impact of the one-child policy.
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birth and in the marriage market are constant.
We now consider matching in the marriage market, between men born at any date t and
women born at t +  : We assume perfect matching, without any frictions, and require a
matching to be measure preserving, and stable, in the sense of Gale and Shapley (1962).5 In
our context, it is well known that a stable measure preserving matching is essentially unique,
and will be positively assortative. That is, if a boy of realized quality " is matched to a girl
of realized quality ("); then
1  F (") = r[1 G(("))];
where F (:) and G(:) denote the cumulative distribution functions of " and  respectively. If
r < 1; then the lowest quality boys, i.e. a proportion 1   r; will be left unmatched. Let
"= F 1(1   r) denote the lowest quality boy that is matched in this case. If r > 1, the
lowest quality girls, of proportion 1  1
r
; will be left unmatched. Let = G 1(1  1
r
) denote
the lowest quality girl that is matched.
Since the quality of the o¤spring is unknown at the time of conception, the ex ante
expected utility of having a boy, as function of the sex ratio, is given by
U(r) =
(
uB + r[B + E()] if r < 1
uB + B + E(j  ) if r  1
:
Similarly, the ex ante expected utility of having a girl is given by
V (r) =
(
uG +
1
r
[G + E(")] if r  1
uG + G + E("j"  ") if r < 1
:
Suppose now that sex selection is very costly, so that it is never exercised. We shall
assume in this paper that the natural sex ratio at birth is 1.6 The sex ratio in the marriage
market is given by the rate of growth of cohort size, : Thus the payo¤ di¤erence between
having a boy and having a girl is given by
5That is, if M is the set of men and W is the set of women, a matching is a function  : M!W[f0g that
satises the following properties. First, if w = (m); then w is not the image of any other m0 2 M under ;
i.e. any woman can be matched only to a single man. Second, if MM, the Lebesgue measure of Mequals
that of the set (M): Third, if w = (m); then both m and w prefer to be matched to each other rather
than being single. Finally, if w 6= (m); then either m prefers (m) to w or w prefers her current match to
m.
6The natural sex ratio at birth is about 0.95; however, boys usually have higher mortality than girls,
although this appears not to be the case in India and China (Anderson and Ray, 2009). Our results do not
depend very much on this divergence, since our focus is on selection, where the sex ratio diverges from the
natural one.
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[uB + B + E(j  ]  [uG +
1

(G + E("))] > 0.
If cohort sizes are increasing, then boys are preferred to girls not only due to possible son
preference (i.e. if uB+B > uG+G) but also due to the fact that girls have poorer marriage
market prospects boys will be matched for sure and secure a higher quality partner, while
girls are matched only with probability 1

:
Let the cost of sex selection be su¢ ciently small that it will be exercised. Consider
rst the case of ex post selection, e.g. via sex selective abortions. In this case, a pregnant
mother observes the sex of foetus and can pay a cost c to have an abortion and conceive
another child. Suppose that the foetus is female, and has value V (r): By having an abortion
and trying again, the parent gets the ex ante expected utility of a child, which is given
by 1
2
fU(r) + V (r)g; minus the cost: So aborting the foetus and trying again is optimal if
U(r) V (r)g  2c; while accepting the girl child is optimal if this inequality is reversed. In
the case of in vitro fertilization, choice is exercised ex ante, before pregnancy. If the parents
select for a boy, they are assured of the certain payo¤, U(r)  c; where c now represents the
cost of in vitro fertilization. By not exercising choice, the parents get the lottery with payo¤
1
2
fU(r) + V (r)g: Thus the incentives for exercising choice are formally identical to the case
of ex post selection, even though choice is associated with the uncertain outcome in the case
of abortions, and with the certain outcome in the case of in vitro fertilization.7However, the
magnitude of the cost involved in selection (c) is likely to be dramatically di¤erent in the
two cases, since in vitro fertilization is much more acceptable from a psychological, ethical
and social point of view. The analysis is easily extended to the case of imperfect ex ante
selection technologies, such as sperm selection if the probability of having a boy is p > 0:5;
then the relevant cost is 2c
2p 1 rather than 2c.
Suppose that 2c < U()   V (). It is clear that r =  cannot be an equilibrium, since
the value of trying again is greater than the cost. At the unique equilibrium, the sex ratio
r must be interior (i.e. in (0; 1)), so it must be the case that a parent is indi¤erent between
accepting a girl child and trying again. This gives us the basic indi¤erence condition:
U(r)  V (r) = 2c: (1)
The intuition for this condition is straightforward: by exercising choice when one has a
girl, a parent gets an improvement in value from V (r) to U(r); with probability one half:
7This equivalence follows from the assumed separability between gender specic payo¤s and the cost of
selection. Also, if there is an endowment e¤ect, then this could make accepting the status quo (the girl child)
more valuable in the case of ex post selection. These considerations are likely to be dwarfed by the di¤erence
in direct psychological costs associated with the two technologies.
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Indi¤erence requires that the expected value of this equals the cost c:
Consider rst a society where  > 1; so that there is population growth but where gender
bias in preferences is mild or non-existent so that (uB+B) (uG+G) < 2c: The equilibrium
sex ratio in the marriage market, r; must be greater one in the absence of signicant gender
bias. To see this, observe that when the marriage market is balanced, U(1) V (1)  2c < 0;
so that it is not worthwhile to select for boys. However, selection for boys must take place
if the sex ratio is to fall below ; and the indi¤erence condition (1) must be satised: Thus,
the equilibrium sex ratio in the marriage market, r; must exceed one, while the sex ratio at
birth, r; will be less than one.
Now let us consider a society where there is signicant gender bias in preferences, so
that (uB + B)   (uG + G) > 2c: In this case, parents will prefer to select for boys when
the marriage market is balanced. Thus the equilibrium sex ratio, r; must be less than one,
and selection will aggravate the imbalance in the marriage market due to population growth
rather than alleviating it.
To summarize: if cohort sizes are growing, costly sex selection will alleviate the imbalance
in the marriage market, but not entirely eliminate it, if parental gender preferences are
unbiased or if the bias is relatively mild. However, if there is signicant gender bias in
preferences, there is an oversupply of boys in the marriage market. Our analysis also shows
that no matter whether we have large gender bias or not, the equilibrium marriage market
sex ratio r does not depend upon the rate of population growth, . This is clear from the
indi¤erence condition (1) neither U(r) nor V (r) depend upon .8 This implies that the
sex ratio at birth adjusts to variations in ; so as to keep r invariant:
We may also ask, what is the implication of the proportion of boys in births being
di¤erent from 0:5? This is relevant in the context of the argument by Oster (2005) that
hepatitis B infection raises the share of boys in births, and is responsible in large portion for
the excess of boys in China. 9 However, this assumes that there is no behavioral response
by parents to the incidence of the virus, as Oster acknowledges. Let p denote the probability
of having a boy, as assessed by the parents. The equilibrium marriage market sex ratio r
depends only on the assessed p; and via the indi¤erence condition, which must be re-written
as U(r)   V (r) = c
p
: Thus the e¤ect on the equilibrium sex ratio depends upon whether
parents are aware of the link between hepatitis B and the sex ratio at birth. If they are
8This is subject to the caveat that we are at an equilibrium with selection; otherwise (i.e. when there is
little gender bias and when  is small), this is not true, since r = :
9This has been questioned by a number of authors, and qualied by Oster herself. Most compelling are
the ndings of Lin and Luoh (2008). They use Taiwanese data on the mothers hepatitis B status at the time
of pregnacy, and nd that this does not contribute signicantly to explaining imbalances in the sex ratio at
birth.
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unaware, as seems most likely given that this is a relatively new hypothesis even in the
scientic community, then they continue to assume that p = 0:5: Thus, r and the sex ratio
at birth do not change, and the behavioral response completely o¤sets any direct e¤ect of
hepatitis B upon the sex ratio at birth. If mothers are aware of the link (but not of their own
hepatitis B status), then the equilibrium sex ratio will be given by the modied indi¤erence
condition, and thus the behavioral response partially o¤sets the direct e¤ects. We refer the
interested reader to the discussion paper version of this paper for a more complete analysis
of this issue. This analysis also applies if there is any reason why p may di¤er from 1: For
example, the natural ratio at birth in appears to be around 0.94 or 0.95, and mortality data
show that this excess of boys is not o¤set by di¤erential mortality in the case of India and
China (see Anderson and Ray, 2009).
We have assumed that the age gap in marriage,  ; is xed. In separate work, I analyze
how the age gap corresponding to a Gale-Shapley style stable matching responds to variations
in population growth, g. Suppose that men and women have single-peaked preferences over
the age gap at marriage, with men having an ideal age gap B > 0; while the womens
ideal gap is G > 0: With non-transferable utility, the equilibrium age gap  will equal the
ideal point of the short side of the market. That is, it will be equal to B if there is excess
supply of women in the marriage market, and G if there is an excess supply of men. If the
marriage market is balanced, then there can be multiple equilibria, with  taking any value
between the two ideal points. Thus our assumption that  is xed corresponds to the case
where G = B: If the ideal points di¤er, then the age gap is relatively insensitive to changes
in the sex ratio, since it changes only when market conditions change from excess supply to
excess demand. More generally, it is not the case that the age gap adjusts to reduce excess
supply in the marriage market. If gender bias is large, there will be excess supply of men in
the marriage market, and the equilibrium age gap will be G: There is an indirect e¤ect of
the endogeneity of  upon r women get a higher payo¤ since  = G, and this raises V (r)
and reduces U(r), thereby increasing the equilibrium sex ratio r: Similarly, in the absence
of gender bias, there will be an excess supply of women due to the marriage squeeze, and
this means that  = B: This has direct e¤ects on r and, indirectly, a negative e¤ect on r
by raising mens payo¤s and reducing womens.
Welfare implications
Let us now examine the welfare implications of parental choice. The literature on sex
selection in societies with gender bias has assumed that sex selection is immoral per se. In-
deed, sex selective abortions have been termed "genocide" or "gendericide".10 This however
begs several question. In the societies under discussion (e.g. India or China), abortion is
10Gendericide is a neologism that refers to the mass killing of members of a specic sex.
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legal and also morally acceptable, implying that these societies do not endow the foetus with
an unconditional "right to life". If this is indeed the case, then why are selective abortions
deemed immoral? Even if society is able to prevent sex selective abortions, it cannot ensure
that the unwanted girls are loved and taken care of. Furthermore, newer selection technolo-
gies such as in vitro fertilization or preconception gender selection are less open to absolutist
moral objections. In this paper, we assume a non-paternalistic welfare evaluation, and con-
sider the welfare of the individual parent. Since all parents are ex ante identical (before the
realization of the sex of their child), we take as our welfare criterion the expected ex ante
utility of a typical parent this also equals the sum of realized utilities of the parents in this
society. Thus welfare, as a function of the sex ratio r; is given by
W (r) =
1
1 + r
U(r) +
r
1 + r
V (r)  c1  r
1 + r
: (2)
That is, a proportion 1
1+r
of parents have boys, and get utility U(r); while the remainder
have girls and utility V (r): The third term is the cost associated with changing the sex ratio
at birth from 1 to r: Suppose that the social planner can choose the level of r; and consider
how she might choose in order to maximize welfare function we shall see that tax/subsidy
schemes can serve as instruments. The derivative of welfare with respect to r equals
W 0(r) =
[V (r) + 2c  U(r)] + (1 + r)[U 0(r) + rV 0(r)]
(1 + r)2
(3)
U(r) and V (r) are di¤erentiable everywhere except at r = 1; with derivatives :
U 0(r) =
(
B + E(") if r < 1
E[j] 
r
if r > 1
:
V 0(r) =
(
" E["j""]
r
if r < 1
 G+E()
r2
if r > 1
:
If r < 1; then an increase in r raises male utility by increasing the probability that a boy
nds a partner. It also reduces female utility, since lower quality males are also matched;
however, since the idiosyncratic component of match quality is assumed to be small relative
to B; the positive e¤ect on males outweighs the negative e¤ect on females. Similarly, when
r > 1; a reduction in r has a positive e¤ect on females, which is greater in absolute value
than the negative e¤ect on males.
Consider the derivative of welfare with respect to r, (3), evaluated at the equilibrium
r: The rst term in the numerator equals zero, since the indi¤erence condition (1) holds at
equilibrium. Thus, the sign of the derivative equals that of U 0(r) + rV 0(r); evaluated at r:
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This depends upon whether r is less than or greater than one, and given by
[U 0(r) + rV 0(r)]jr=r =
(
B + E())  E["j""] " > 0 if r < 1
1
r
n
E(j  )     G+E(")

o
< 0 if r > 1
:
If we assume that the idiosyncratic component of value (" or ) is small relative to the
systematic component G or B, then the derivative will be positive when r
 < 1 and negative
when r > 1: Thus, if r < 1; then welfare is increasing in r; while if r is greater than one,
welfare is decreasing in r: In the appendix we show that the global welfare optimum is at
r = 1; so that if a social planner could control the extent of sex selection, she would aim
for a sex ratio at birth that corresponds to a balanced marriage market. This requires an
additional assumption, A1, that the idiosyncratic component on preferences is small relative
to the average payo¤ of a boy or a girl, and that population growth is not extremely large.11
Assumption A1: "  (B + E());   +1 2 (G + E(")) and  + 1 > 2:
Our results show gender bias results in a male biased sex ratio on the marriage market,
and this is ine¢ cient. The intuition for this ine¢ ciency is as follows. Consider an equilibrium
r < 1, and a parent who is selecting for a boy. If this parent decides not to select, she su¤ers
no loss in payo¤, since she is indi¤erent between selecting and not selecting at r: However,
the decision not to exercise choice has a positive e¤ect, since at the aggregate level, two more
boys will nd partners for sure. That is, there is a congestion externality in the marriage
market which is not taken into account by parents who select.
However, selection has positive welfare e¤ects in societies without large gender bias,
by reducing the marriage market imbalance due to population growth and the age gap at
marriage. In this case, selection exerts a positive externality, by reducing congestion. Here
again, parents do not take this externality into account, and as a result, the equilibrium
results in an unbalanced marriage market sex ratio, with too many girls.
Our welfare results have been obtained even though we take as our welfare criterion the
expected utility of the typical parent, who may well have gender biased preferences. If we
were to take into account the utility of the children, and use a utilitarian social welfare
function, this would only reinforce our conclusions, since we may assume that girls do not
have a preference to be boys instead. Thus the welfare gains from a balanced sex ratio would
be larger in this case.
We now consider the implications of changes in c upon equilibrium welfare, at an interior
equilibrium where the indi¤erence condition (1) is satised. Let W (c) denote equilibrium
11The assumption on population growth is satised in all existing societies. Assumption A1 is not sym-
metric with regards to the payo¤ parameters on boys and girls. This is due to population growth, and the
fact that welfare criterion weights the utilities of the sexes according to their proportions at birth, which
must be unequal if the marriage market is balanced.
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welfare as a function of c; i.e., W (c)  W (r(c)): Since it is optimal at r for a parent to
accept the child that nature deals her, this can be written as
W (c) = 0:5fU(r(c)) + V (r(c))g:
Since the di¤erence between U(r) and V (r) equals 2c; this can be re-written as
W (c) = V (r(c)) + c:
From the indi¤erence condition that determines r; dr

dc
= 2
U 0(r) V 0(r) . So the e¤ect of welfare
is given by
dW 
dc
= 1 +
2V 0(r)
U 0(r)  V 0(r) :
V 0(r) < 0 and U 0(r) > 0; and so the second term is negative. Thus the e¤ect on welfare
of an increase in cost is positive when jV 0(:)j < jU 0(:)j and negative otherwise. So when
r < 1; since jV 0(:)j < jU 0(:)j ; an increase in c increases welfare, since the equilibrium sex
ratio becomes more balanced. In other words, technological progress, that makes selective
abortions easier, reduces welfare, if the equilibrium sex ratio already has an excess of boys.
On the other hand, if r > 1; a reduction in c makes the sex ratio more balanced, and thus
increases welfare.
We summarize our results in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 If there is large son preference ((uB + B)  (uG + G) > 2c), sex selection
biases the equilibrium sex ratio, and results in a socially ine¢ cient outcome, with too many
boys. If there is little or no son preference /((uB + B)  (uG + G) < 2c), and the marriage
market imbalance is due to population growth and the age gap at marriage, then sex selection
increases welfare, and is insu¢ cient at the equilibrium, since there is an excess supply of girls
on the marriage market. In either case, social welfare is maximized when the sex ratio in the
marriage market is balanced, provided that assumption A1 is satised. Technological progress
that reduces the cost of selection, c; reduces welfare if the marriage market equilibrium has
an excess of boys; it raises welfare if there is an excess of girls.
It may be plausibly argued that the recent increases in the sex ratio in China and parts
of India are not an equilibrium phenomenon, in the sense that parents may have incorrect
expectations regarding the aggregate sex ratio and future marriage prospects. Learning
models suggest that societies will be able to learn rational expectations equilibria in stable
environments; however, recent technological developments have been so rapid that one cannot
assume that expectations are rational. Since our welfare results are global, they apply also
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in this case, in the sense that selection is welfare reducing if the marriage market has an
excess of boys (and is welfare improving otherwise). Thus if expectational errors result in
an over-reaction of the sex ratio, the adverse welfare e¤ects of selection are aggravated.
Table 1: Required & Actual Number of Boys per 100 Girls
g  required # boys # boys gap
China (total) -5.0 1.8 91.2 120.2 +29.0
China (Han) -5.4 1.8 90.5 121.2 +30.7
China (non Han) -2.6 1.8 91.4 112.8 +17.4
India (total) 3.4 4.6 116.8 (112.9) 107.8  8:0 (-5.1)
West 4.3 4.5 120.9 (115.7) 110.6  10.3 (-5.1)
Central 3.5 3.8 114.1 (110.2) 108.3  3:9 (-1.9)
South 2.8 5.5 116.5 (113.3) 105.0  11:2 (-8.3)
East 2.6 5.0 113.9 (111.0) 105.1  8:8 (-5.9)
North East 1.5 5.6 108.9 (107.0) 103.6  5:3 (-3.4)
North West 2.9 2.8 111.5 (108.3) 122.2 10.7 (11.9)
Notes: g : in China, based on a regression of cohort size upon age (between 2 and 8) in 2000 census. in
India, based growth rate of population age 0-6 between censuses of 1991 and 2001.  : di¤erence between
singulate mean ages at marriage for men and women. China: data from United Nations, 2003. India: Census
report (1991b). Column 3 and 5 gures in brackets are with  adjusted down by 1 year.
Proposition 1 implies that the answer to question, is sex selection welfare reducing or
not, is an empirical one. Table 1 shows computations of the of the situation in the marriage
market of the future in China and India, based on the situation in the birth cohorts immedi-
ately preceding the censuses of 2000 (China) and 2001 (India). For China, we present gures
for the overall population, the majority Han population (who comprise almost 90% of the
population) and for the minorities. India is more linguistically and culturally heterogeneous,
and we therefore present gures for the major geographical regions.12 Column 1 is an es-
timate of g; the rate of growth of cohort size. Column 2 reports the age gap at marriage,
which is calculated as the di¤erence between the singulate mean age at marriages for men
and women. Column 3 is an estimate of the required number of males per 100 females 
it is e¤ectively a calculation of  = (1 + g) ; times 100: We have made an adjustment for
the di¤erence between mortality rates for females and males, between the ages 5 and 20,
as computed in Anderson and Ray (2009), but this adjustment has quantitatively negligible
12We have also computed these gures at state level (this is probably most appropriate for the marriage
market, given that states are oganized on a linguistic basis), but do not present these for reasons of space.
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e¤ects for the sex ratio in the marriage market.13 The gures in brackets in column 3 are
estimates for India where the age gap at marriage in column 2 is reduced by one year.14
Column 4 reports the actual sex ratios, in terms of males per 100 females. The nal column
reports the gap between required and actual number of males per 100 females.
The results of Table 1 are striking. In China, cohort sizes are shrinking rapidly, at 5% per
annum, even though population growth is positive. Even with a small age gap at marriage,
of 1.8 years, this results in a large reverse marriage squeeze. Proposition 1 therefore implies
that welfare optimality requires selection for girls. However, the sex ratio at birth shows a
large excess of boys. The marriage market is predicted to have over 30 extra boys per 100
girls. This is enormous one in four boys amongst those born around the year 2000 will
not nd a partner in future. Since 37 million boys were in the age group 0-4, over 9 million
of them would be doomed to remain single. In the age group 0-9, over 21 million are be
predicted to remain single. The conclusion, that sex selection in China is welfare reducing,
is hard to escape.
The situation in India is quite di¤erent. Despite the slowdown in population growth in
recent years to less than 1.5% per annum, cohort sizes are growing at more than double
that rate, at 3.4%. Coupled with a large age gap at marriage, this implies that marriage
market balance requires a more male biased sex ratio than the one that actually prevails. At
a more disaggregated level, when one looks at the situations across regions, we nd that in
the North-West of the country, where there are highly male biased sex ratios (120 boys per
100 girls), there is an excess supply of boys. Elsewhere, we nd that there is a signicant
excess supply of girls. This is particularly large in the Southern states, due both to the fact
that the sex ratio at birth is more favorable in these states, and due to the larger age gap at
marriage in the South as compared to the North. These empirical ndings, both for China
and India, appear to be novel, since they based on the rates of growth of cohort size.15
This evidence implies that sex selection has adverse social consequences in China, so
13Anderson and Ray (2009) nd that for India, di¤erential mortality between the ages 5 and 20 results
in an extra 0.2 males per 100 females. Since the actual sex ratio in India in column 4 pertains to the age
group 0-6, this is the appropriate correction. In China, di¤erential mortality up to age 24 adds 4.1 males
per 100 females; however, most of this di¤erence is attributable to the higher mortality of girls in infancy.
The actual sex ratio for China in column 4 is the average until age 4. Since di¤erenctial morality after age 4
is negligible, this correction has negligible e¤ects. We also do not make any adjustment for polygyny, since
this is quantitatively insignicant in both China and India.
14The age gap at marriage is dened as the di¤erence between the singulate mean ages at marriage of men
and women, and reects the age gap in the stock of married individuals, rather than current marriages. The
downward adjustment by one year is an attempt to take into account the fact that the age gap at marriage
is declining in India over a twenty year period, the age gap fell by 1.2 years.
15For example, Neelakantan and Tertilt (2008) compute marriage market sex ratios based on population
growth gures. These di¤er considerably from cohort size growth, for both India and China, and the
di¤erence is magnied due to compounding over the age gap.
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that the current Chinese policy banning sex selective abortions may be well motivated.
India also has a ban, and this may have foundation for the North West. However, a ban
seems unworkable, since it is impossible to verify that a sex selective abortion has indeed
taken place. However, there are alternative Pigouvian balanced budget tax-transfers that
can incentivize parents to have girls. These would work by increase the value of girls to
parents while reducing that of boys, e.g. via di¤erential school fees or by explicit subsidies.
Suppose that the government subsidizes each girl by an amount sG; and taxes each boy an
amount tB: If the levels of these are set so that uB+B tB 2c = uG+G+sG; then parents
will be indi¤erent between boys and girls when the sex ratio in the marriage market is one.
Since budget balance can be ensured by setting tB = sG; we have balanced budget tax
subsidies that result in a Pareto improvement, and can ensure the socially optimal outcome.
Policy makers have recently taken steps in this direction for example, on 3 March 2008
IANS reported that "in a move to stop female feticide and stabilize the skewed sex ratio, the
Indian government announced an insurance cover for poor families with girl children that will
see incentives at every step - when she is given vaccinations, sent to school and not married
o¤ before 18...The scheme would be rst started in seven educationally backward states as
a pilot project and later extended to the entire nation." However, this scheme seems partly
motivated by redistributive considerations, since it was introduced mainly in the poorest
regions in the country, where male biased sex ratios are not a serious issue only one of the
pilot regions is located in the North-West. Furthermore, as we shall see in section 4, there
are theoretical reasons why selection for boys will be more signicant in the upper classes
than among the poor. Thus well designed tax-transfers, that are targeted to address the
congestion externality directly, have yet to be introduced.
2 Intra-household allocation & the sex ratio
A shortage of women in the marriage market is likely to improve their bargaining power and
their share of household resources (Becker, 1981). Angrist (2002) nds that a reduction in
the sex ratio r in immigrant marriage markets in the US reduces the labor supply of women
and raises that of men. Chiappori et al. (2002) estimate a structural model of distributional
e¤ects and nd that a reduction in r reduces womens labor supply and increases their share
of household resources, while raising the labor supply of men. These distributional e¤ects
have implications for parental selection decisions. If parents are altruistic, they will take into
account the e¤ects of the sex ratio upon the utility of their child. Parents whose children
are on the short side of the market may also be able to capture a portion of these scarcity
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rents in the form of bride prices or dowries. Finally, these changes in the sex ratio may alter
existing social norms and relations between children and their parents. It has been argued
that parents prefer sons in India and China since traditionally sons support their parents
in old age while daughters do not. If the bargaining power of daughters increases within
the marriage, they may have a greater say on the pattern of inter-generational transfers and
these norms may change.16
To model these e¤ects, we now allow intra household allocation to be negotiated between
the parties at the time of marriage. We would like household allocations to vary continuously
with the sex ratio, as the above cited empirical evidence suggests. To this end, we embed
the bargaining process in a marriage market subject to search frictions that denes the
outside options of the parties. Consider an innite horizon continuous time model, where uB
and uG now represent ow payo¤s from having a boy and a girl respectively, and i denotes
the interest rate. Let  be the ow payo¤ from marriage for each partner.17 Let t be the
net transfer of household resources from the man to the woman  a negative value of t
corresponds to a transfer from the woman to the man. Let (t) be the value to the woman
of this transfer. Perfect transferability corresponds to the case where (t) = t; while under
imperfect transferability, (t) is strictly concave, with (0) = 0 and 0(0) = 1: We shall also
assume that both partners are able to make binding commitments regarding the division of
the payo¤ for the duration of the marriage.18 Parents take into account the e¤ects of the
transfers, so that the value to a parent, from a married boy, and a married girl, are given by:
Um =
uB +   t
i
;
V m =
uG + + (t)
i
:
At any instant, there are stocks of unmarried boys and unmarried girls, of measures  and
x respectively, so that x denotes the sex ratio in the stocks. We shall assume that matches
arrive according to a Poisson process, where the arrival rate is increasing in both stocks,
16A caveat is in order here since support for aged parents takes place many years after the marriage, it
may be hard for commitments at the time of marriage to be enforced.
17For simplicity, we assume that there is no idiosyncratic component to match value  our analysis
extends, at the cost of additional notational burden, to the where idiosyncratic component is small relative
to search frictions. Our assumption that the payo¤ from marriage is the same for both parties is without
loss of generality if there is perfect transferability of utility.
18The importance of commitment power has been emphasized by several authors, e.g. Lundberg and
Pollak (2003). In the absence of commitment, the results will be similar to the model without transfers,
unless parties are able to capitalize future transfers at the time of marriage, in the form of bride prices or
dowries.
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di¤erentiable and a symmetric function of its arguments. We also assume constant returns
to scale so that the analysis maybe conducted in terms of x; the sex ratio, without reference
to absolute market size : Let (x) (resp. (x)) denote the arrival rate of matches for a
girl (resp. boy), where (x)  x (x) : (x) is strictly increasing in x; while (x) is strictly
decreasing. Finally, we shall assume that matching becomes more e¢ cient if the market
is more balanced, i.e. the number of matches per unit population is single peaked, with a
maximum at x = 1:The values of a single boy and a single girl depend upon the sex ratio x
and upon the prevailing transfer t; and are
U(x; t) =
uB
i
+

i( + i)
(B   t):
V (x; t) =
uG
i
+

i(+ i)
(G + (t)):
The transfer t, from the boy to the girl, is determined by Nash bargaining between the
two parties. That is the equilibrium transfer t is given by the Nash bargaining solution
where the outside options are given by the values to remaining single, U(x; t) and U(x; t):19
Now, in an equilibrium, the negotiated transfer between the matched pair, t; must itself be
equal to the prevailing transfer in the market: This allows us to solve for t as a function of
x; and this is dened implicitly by the condition
+ (t)
  t =
(x) + i
(x) + i
: (4)
Let ~U(x) = U(x; t(x)), and ~V (x) = V (x; t(x)) denote the value of singles as a function
of x alone, given that t = t(x). We can now determine the equilibrium sex ratio in the
stock, x: This must be such that di¤erence in values between boys and girls at the time of
birth equals the expected cost of selection:
~U(x)  ~V (x) = 2c: (5)
We now turn to the relation between the sex ratio in stocks and that in the ow of births.
Assume that the ow of new births is exogenously given at g; let  be the fraction of births
that are girls, and let the instantaneous death rate be : In a steady state the sex ratio in
the stock must be stationary, giving us the relation
19Alternatively, we could assume that the outside options constrain the bargaining solution, but do not
otherwise a¤ect it. The specication we have chosen allows the maximal e¤ect of the sex ratio upon the
bride price. Alternative specications would only make the equilibrium more ine¢ cient.
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(x) =
g + (x)(x  1)
2g
:
The equilibrium sex ratio in the ow of births is given by (x): Note that (x) equals 1
at x = 1 and is less than one if x < 1:
We show rst that the equilibrium sex ratio x must be less than 1 if uB   uG > 2ci:
For if this is the case, then at x = 1; ~U(1)   ~V (1) = uB uG
i
(since the matching function
is symmetric, (x) = (x) when x = 1) and thus it is optimal to try again on having a
girl. However, the sex ratio will be less biased towards boys than in the absence of transfers.
Furthermore, the sex ratio will be less biased the greater the degree of transferability of
utility, i.e. the closer (t) is to being linear.
Consider now the implications of population growth and the age gap at marriage. We
may model this by assuming that the proportion of the ow of girls, in the absence of
selection, ^; is greater than one-half. In the absence of selection, the sex ratio in the stock
will be x^ =  1(^) > 1: The corresponding equilibrium transfer, t(x^); is given by equation
(4), and will be negative if x^ > 1; thus marriage squeeze results in positive groom prices or
dowries: t is a decreasing function of x^ (see appendix), implying that if the marriage squeeze
intensies, this increases the level of dowries. This provides an explanation for the increase
in dowries in the twentieth century in India (see Rao, 1993), and their spread to parts of
the country where they were not prevalent. It is important to clarify that an increase in
population growth will raise dowries in a continuous way in a frictional market since there
has been some controversy in the literature. Anderson (2007)) argues that the marriage
squeeze cannot cause dowry ination, but considers only a one-o¤ increase in population,
which then returns to its stationary level this cannot cause a permanent increase in dowries.
Also, she assumes perfect matching and transferable utility, and in such a world, the e¤ect
of sustained population growth on dowries would be discontinuous there is a jump increase
when population growth becomes positive, and no further increase with further rises in
population growth, since dowries are already at their maximal level.
If x^ > 1; ~V (x^) < ~U(x^): If c is su¢ ciently small, it is optimal to select for boys. Thus the
equilibrium sex ratio x must satisfy the indi¤erence condition (5). Consider now the case
where gender bias is mild or absent, i.e. uB   uG > 2ci: In equilibrium, the payo¤ of boys
must exceed the payo¤ of girls, so that that x > 1: The sex ratio in the marriage market
is therefore biased against girls. Here again, the sensitivity of intra-household allocations or
dowries to the sex ratio implies less bias than in the absence of such transfers.
Turning to welfare, the expected welfare of the parent is given by
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W (x) = (1  (x)) ~U(x) + (x) ~V (x)  (1  2)c:
The derivative of welfare with respect to x equals
W 0(x) =
n
(1  ) ~U 0(x) +  ~V 0(x)
o
+
n
0(x)[V ~(x) + 2c  ~U(x)]
o
: (6)
The rst term in curly brackets is the "match e¢ ciency e¤ect" how the (weighted) sum of
the utilities of the two sexes responds to x:Match e¢ ciency is concave in x and maximized at
x = 1; i.e. when the market is balanced (see appendix). The second term in curly brackets
is (a positive multiple of) the private benet from accepting a girl as compared to trying
again. Thus this term is strictly negative when x > x and strictly positive if the inequality
is reversed. This decomposition of equation (6) gives us two immediate results. Consider
rst the case of signicant gender bias, so that x < 1: The equilibrium outcome is socially
ine¢ cient, with the sex ratio being too low, since at x; the second term is zero, and thus
W 0 (x)jx=x > 0: The social optimum x
 lies between x and 1; since at 1 the rst term is
zero and the second term is negative implying that W 0 (x)jx=1 < 0:We conclude therefore
that welfare is increasing in x at x; i.e. the equilibrium proportion of girls is too low from a
welfare point of view. Parental choice results in an ine¢ cient outcome, with too many boys,
since parents do not internalize the congestion externality in the marriage market.
In the case where there is little or no gender bias, and population growth so that x >
1; the social optimum x will be smaller than x; so that there is too little selection in
equilibrium. Thus the main ndings of our model of section 1 appear to be robust.
With frictional matching social optimality does not require r = 1. From equation (6),
at x = 1 the match e¢ ciency term is zero but the private benet term is negative, and so
welfare is decreasing in x: The welfare optimal level of x lies between x and 1.20
Our results here are related to the literature on job creation in search models of unem-
ployment, as in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). This literature nds that job creation is
typically ine¢ cient, although the direction of the ine¢ ciency is ambiguous there maybe too
few or too many jobs. The di¤erence is, in our context of parental choice, a child may enter
on either side of the market either as a boy or as a girl. The preference for boys over girls,
coupled with the symmetry of the bargaining situation, permits an unambiguous conclusion
welfare increases by making the market more balanced. In particular, with large gender
20This is the one qualitative nding of the basic model of section 1 that appears not to be robust With
frictionless matching, match e¢ ciency is a non-di¤erentiable function of the sex ratio, r; since the number of
matches is equals the short side of the market. Thus the loss in match e¢ ciency is rst-order in 1  r: With
frictions, the loss in match e¢ ciency is of second order in the di¤erence (1   r); implying that the optimal
sex ratio is below 1:
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bias, the equilibrium has too many boys, relative to the welfare optimum. In the job cre-
ation literature, Hosios (1990) has shown that appropriate assignment of bargaining power
between the two sides can ensure an e¢ cient allocation. In the present context, when there
is large gender bias, e¢ ciency requires that women have greater bargaining power than men,
even when marriage markets are balanced. This seems somewhat unlikely given the inferior
status of women in traditional societies. In an illuminating study on India, Bloch and Rao
(2002) show that married men use domestic violence in order to extract additional payments
from their in-laws. The irreversibility of marriage in traditional societies, in conjunction with
the vulnerability of women within marriage, may move e¤ective bargaining power towards
men. Such an asymmetry would only aggravate the ine¢ ciency that we nd, resulting in a
worse sex ratio, i.e. a lower equilibrium value of x:
We now examine the e¤ects of technological progress, i.e. a reduction in c; upon equilib-
rium welfare, W (x(c)): Using the indi¤erence condition, this can be written as
dW (x(c)
dc
=
@ ~V
@x

x=x
dx
dc
+ 1:
=
2~V 0(x)jx=x
~U 0(x) jx=x   ~V 0(x) jx=x
+ 1: (7)
The results here are exactly parallel with those in section 1. When x < 1; ~V 0(x) jx=x < 0
is smaller than ~U 0(x) jx=x in absolute magnitude, due to the match e¢ ciency e¤ect. Thus
the rst term is negative but greater than  1; and thus equilibrium welfare is an increasing
function of c; since a higher value of c increases x: Conversely, when x > 1; technological
progress increases welfare. We summarize our results as follows:
Proposition 2 Consider a marriage market with frictional matching, where match e¢ -
ciency is maximized when the sex ratio is balanced. If uB  uG > ci, both the equilibrium sex
ratio and the welfare optimal sex ratio are biased towards boys, and the equilibrium has ex-
cessive boys compared to the welfare optimum. Technological progress that reduces c reduces
welfare. Conversely, if uB   uG < ci; and there is a natural excess supply of girls due to the
marriage squeeze, the equilibrium sex ratio has an excessive number of girls.
Our main result, that the equilibrium sex ratio is ine¢ cient in the presence of gender
bias, is quite general, and applies as long as intra-household allocations vary continuously
with the sex ratio. That is, as long as t (:) is a continuous function, equilibrium requires
adjustment in quantities as well as prices. This ine¢ ciency can be avoided only if t varies
discontinuously with x (or r); as in Walrasian models. In a Walrasian world, t =  if there is
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an excess supply of men, but can take any value between   and  if the market is balanced.
Thus a balanced sex ratio can be supported by a positive value of t that provides parents
with su¢ cient incentives to avoid selecting for boys. The empirical literature (Angrist, 2002;
Chiappori et al., 2002) adopts specications where household allocations vary continuously
with marriage market conditions. Our purpose here has been to obtain these results in the
context of a fully micro-founded model, where transfers are determined by Nash bargaining,
where the outcomes reect the marriage market position of the two parties.
To summarize, when the sex ratio a¤ects intra-household allocation in a continuous way,
this reduces the magnitude of gender imbalances due to gender biased preferences but does
not eliminate them. Our qualitative conclusions, that selection that results in sex ratio
imbalances is welfare reducing, are una¤ected. That is, the congestion externalities identied
in section 1 continue to play a key role in determining welfare. The policy implications, that
governments should subsidize girls and tax boys if the sex ratio has an excess of boys, is also
reinforced.
3 Parental Investment
How do biases in the sex ratio a¤ect parental care and investment decisions in children of the
two sexes? This question is of great importance for the interpretation of micro evidence on
health and educational investments. It is also relevant for understanding sex ratio e¤ects on
bride prices or dowries. If the agents on the long side of the market (e.g. boys) cannot make
binding commitments to future intra-household transfers, then the only credible transfers
must be in the form of bride prices. To the extent that capital markets are imperfect, the
parents of boys must then save in advance to nance these bride prices.21 This question is
also empirically relevant. Wei and Zhang (2009) argue that the phenomenal increase in the
Chinese savings rate is attributable to sex ratio imbalances, and the competitive pressure felt
by the parents of boys. Furthermore, these investment decisions a¤ect the relative payo¤s to
having boys and girls, so that we need to jointly determine gender selection and investment
decisions in general equilibrium.
At the outset, one must distinguish, conceptually, between two types of investments, those
that reduce infant or child mortality, and those that improve the "quality" of the o¤spring
on the marriage market. Basic health care, such as immunization, are an example of the
former, while education is an instance of the latter. The e¤ects of the sex ratio on mortality
reducing expenditures is straightforward. Since the value of girls is decreasing in r; while
21These arguments also apply if dowries are partly a form of pre-mortem bequests, as argued by Zhang
and Chan (1999) and Botticini and Siow (2003), since the other partner also benets.
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the value of boys is increasing, an increase in r raises health expenditures in boys relative
to girls. Several papers have documented gender discrimination in diet and in vaccinating
children in India see, for example, Dasgupta (1997), Pande (2003) and Barooah (2004).
Thus, theory suggests that the marriage squeeze is in part responsible for these asymmetries
in health expenditures, although gender bias also plays a part. With sex selection reducing
the sex ratio, one should see these asymmetries being reversed.
More complex is the e¤ect of the sex ratio upon parental investments that also raise the
utility to the partner and thereby improve the childs position in the marriage market. These
are subject to a potential hold-up problem, since parents may not internalize the benets
that the partner gets from these investments. Peters and Siow (2002) set out a model of
pre-marital investments in a frictionless economy. There are xed measures of boys and girls,
each with an associated exogenous distribution of parental wealth. Peters and Siow focus on
a rational expectations equilibrium, where the parent of a boy who invests x conjectures that
the match quality of the partner will be given by a strictly increasing function (x); while
the parent of a girl who invests y conjectures that her match quality will be given by  1(y):
These expectations have to be satised for investment levels that are actually chosen, but
could be arbitrary for investment levels that are not chosen in equilibrium. They show that
a rational expectations equilibrium is e¢ cient, so that the hold up problem vanishes.
We now show that it is problematic to apply their analysis to our context, where the
gender of the child is a choice variable, since an equilibrium will, in general, not exist under
gender biased preferences. This arises due to a discontinuity in payo¤s at r = 1: Assume
that the parent derives a direct benet bi(x) from an investment of x in a child of gender
i 2 fG;Bg, and incurs a cost ~ci(x): Dene the net cost of investment in a child, ci(x) =
~ci(x)  bi(x); and assume that this is strictly convex and eventually increasing: The Peters-
Siow analysis implies that when the sex ratio is one, investment in either sex equals the
e¢ cient level, xi ; at a net cost ci(x
); where c0i(x

i ) = 1; since e¢ ciency requires that the
marginal cost equals the marginal benet to the other partner, one. To make our argument
most simply, suppose that the cost and benet functions are the same for both sexes. Since
both boys and girls invest the same amount, the payo¤ di¤erence between a boy and girl
equals (uB + B)   (uG   G); which will be greater than 2c if preferences are su¢ ciently
gender biased. Thus r = 1 cannot be an equilibrium.
Now let us consider a sex ratio r < 1: Let xB (r) and x

G (r) be the e¢ cient investment
levels in boys and girls respectively. The Peters-Siow analysis implies that a measure r of
boys will choose xB (r) and get matched for sure, while the remaining boys are unmatched.
Thus a necessary condition for equilibrium is that the payo¤ to a boy is the same regardless
of whether he is matched or not. But this implies that the payo¤ to a girl will be strictly
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larger: a girl is gets a payo¤ of uG+ + xB (r)  c(xB (r)) > uB +minfc(xB)g; which is the
equilibrium payo¤ for a boy. Thus an equilibrium fails to exist when sex selection is possible.
The problem is, there is a sharp discontinuity in payo¤s boys are preferred to girls when
r = 1; but at r < 1; girls will be strictly preferred to boys since the payo¤ of a boy now
equals that of one who is unmatched for sure.
We now show that equilibrium can be ensured by allowing for an idiosyncratic component
of match value that is unrelated to investment, as we have been assuming in the present
paper. If the investment in a boy is x; then the realized quality, as assessed by the partner
is x + G + ": Similarly, if the investment in a girl is x; then realized quality is given by
x+ B + : We dispense with the assumption that the net cost function, ci; is the same for
both sexes  even if the gross cost function ~ci is identical, it is possible that parents are
more altruistic towards boys more than towards girls, so that the benets from investing in
them could be larger.
Investment decisions given the sex ratio
Suppose that the sex ratio has been determined, so that the relative measure of girls
to boys equals r: At the matching stage, since r  1; all girls should be matched, and the
highest quality boys should be matched. Since every girl is matched, the investment in
her generates benets for herself as well as for her partner, for sure. Thus the rst best
investment level in a girl, xG ; satises c
0
G(x

G ) = 1; i.e. the marginal cost (net of the benet
to her) equals the marginal benet to her partner. Now consider investment in a boy. If we
assume that the idiosyncratic component of match values is su¢ ciently small, then welfare
optimality requires that only a fraction r of boys invest, and that their investments also
satisfy c0B(:) = 1: However, if we restrict attention to symmetric investment strategies, then
investment will take place in all boys, and since investment occurs before " is realized, each
boy has a probability r of being matched. The rst best e¢ cient level of investment in a boy,
xB ; must satisfy c
0
B(x

B ) = r; i.e. the marginal net cost must equal the expected marginal
benet to his partner.
Restrict attention to quasi-symmetric equilibria, where agents on the same side of the
market choose the same investment levels. Let xi ; i 2 fG;Bg denote equilibrium investments
in gender i: A boy of type "  " will be matched with a girl of type ("); where  satises the
condition 1 F (") = r[1 G(("))]: If a parent invests xB+ in his son, the realized match
for any " will be that corresponding to "+; ("+): The matching process denes the
benets from additional investment it improves a boys match quality for any realization
of "; and makes it more likely that he is matched at all. At an equilibrium, the derivative
of the expected payo¤ with respect to  equals zero at  = 0:
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Z "
"
0(")f(")d"+ f(")(B + x

G) = c
0
B(x

B);
The left hand side of this equation has a natural interpretation. By investing a little
more in my son, I improve his match quality by 0(") for every realization of " where he does
get matched. I also increase his probability of getting matched, at a rate f("); and in this
event, his payo¤ equals that from being matched with the worst quality girl, B + x

G: Since
0(") = f(")
rg(("))
, the rst order condition for investment in boys can be re-written as22
1
r
Z "
"
f(")
g(("))
f(")d"+ f(")(B + x

G) = c
0
B(x

B): (8)
We see that if r < 1; this tends to amplify investments in boys, for two reasons. First,
a given increment in investment pushes boys more quickly up the distribution of girls, and
second, there is an incentive to invest in order to increase the probability of match taking
place at all, since there is discontinuous payo¤ loss from not being matched at ":
Similarly, the rst order condition for investment in girls is given byZ 
0
 
 1
0
()g()d = r
Z 
0
g()
f( 1())
g()d = c0(xG): (9)
Notice here that the role of r < 1 is to reduce investment incentives, since an increment
in investment pushes a girl more slowly up the distribution of boy qualities. Furthermore,
the term corresponding to f(")(B + x

G) is missing. That is, there is no reason to invest
in order to increase the match probability since all girls get matched for sure, and the only
reason to invest arises from the consequent improvement in match quality.
We shall assume henceforth that F and G have the same distributions, i.e. the idiosyn-
cratic component of match value is identically distributed in the two sexes. Our rst result
is the investments are e¢ cient when r = 1; since in this case (") = " when the distributions
are equal. Thus the rst term in (8) equals one, and the second term is absent, so that
c0B(x

B) = 1; and similarly c
0
G(x

G) = 1: Thus if the social planner can ensure a balanced sex
ratio, investments need not be regulated since they will coincide with the rst best level.
Intuitively, when r = 1 and F = G; it is as though each person is matched with himself, and
this provides incentives for e¢ cient investment.
Since the integrals in (8) and (9) are quite complex, we now specialize to the case where
f = g and both are uniform on [0; "]: The equilibrium investment levels are dened by
c0B(x

B) = 1 +
B + x

G
"
> 1:
22We assume that the second order condition is satised see the appendix for details.
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c0G(x

G) = r:
Thus we see that there are excessive investment in boys relative to what the social planner
would choose the marginal cost of investment exceeds one, while e¢ ciency at the investment
stage requires c0B(x

B) = r < 1: There are insu¢ cient investments in girls, since c
0
G(x

G) = r
rather than the e¢ cient level, one.
Our results are of interest given evidence suggesting that parents in India favour boys, by
devoting greater care and resources to them. This maybe due to the fact that with gender
biased preferences, parents are more altruistic towards their boys than their girls. Our
analysis shows that this gender bias in investments may be intensied by marriage market
considerations when the sex ratio becomes biased. Paradoxically, even though the position
of girls improves in the marriage market, and raises their value, parents may also reduce
educational investments in them, or save less for their dowries.
Our results are relevant in the context of empirical work by Wei and Zhang (2009),
arguing that the high savings rate in China is due to the sex ratio imbalance. They argue
that parents of boys feel compelled to invest more, raising the overall savings rate. Our
analysis shows that while this is true, this is counterbalanced by the reduced investment
incentive for parents of girls. If we assume that the costs of investment are quadratic,
aggregate investment in the economy, X(r); will be proportional to the weighted sum of
the right hand side of the optimality conditions, i.e.
X(r) =
r
1 + r
xG +
1
1 + r
xB _
1 + r2
1 + r
+
B + x

G
"(1 + r)
:
Note that the rst term, 1+r
2
1+r
; is increasing in r; while the derivative of the second term is
ambiguous, since both the numerator and denominator are increasing in r: However, if f(")
is su¢ ciently large, then parents will invest a large amount in boys in order to improve the
probability that they are matched at all, and this will raise overall investments and savings,
as Wei and Zhang suggest.
Determination of the sex ratio
For r  1; dene the payo¤s to boys and girls, given equilibrium investments:
~U(r) = uB + r[B + E() + x

G]  cB(xB);
~V (r) = uG + G + E("j"  ")] + xB   cB(xG):
We see therefore that the payo¤ di¤erence between boys and girls increases with r; since
xB is decreasing in r and x

G is increasing in r: Thus, if an equilibrium exists, it will be
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unique. The proposition below shows that an equilibrium will exist provided that either the
density function f(:) is continuous at zero, or if f(0) is small enough, so that the discontinuity
at zero is small. In the uniform case, existence is ensured provided that the dispersion in
idiosyncratic values is su¢ ciently large, i.e. if " is large enough.
Proposition 3 Assume that the density function of match values for boys, f(:) is continuous
at zero, or that f(0) < ; where  > 0 is a function of all the parameters. Equilibrium exists
and is unique in an economy where parents choose the gender of their child and how much
to invest. If match values are identically and uniformly distributed across the sexes, such an
equilibrium is characterized by overinvestment in boys and under-investment in girls, relative
to the welfare optimal level, and the sex ratio r is ine¢ ciently low. If a social planner can
ensure a balanced sex ratio, then equilibrium investments will be e¢ cient if match values are
identically distributed for the two sexes.
We therefore see that parental investment decisions partially counteract the sex ratio
implications of gender biased preferences. The parents of boys invest more, and those of
girls invest less, and this raises the payo¤ to having a girl and reduces the payo¤ from
having a boy. Thus the sex ratio is more balanced than it would be in the absence of
parental investments, paralleling our results in the previous section, where the change in
intra-household allocations reduces the sex ratio imbalance. One important di¤erence is
that unlike transfers, the investment decisions have direct e¢ ciency consequences, and are
distorted relative to what the social planner would want. As we have seen, if the social
planner could ensure a balanced sex ratio, then investment decisions would also be e¢ cient,
so that overall e¢ ciency is ensured.
4 Heterogeneity
What are the implications of the population belonging to distinct groups, who are ex ante
heterogeneous, e.g. they belong to di¤erent classes/ castes or linguistic groups? One may
distinguish two distinct cases, horizontal di¤erentiation and vertical di¤erentiation. With
vertical di¤erentiation, groups are hierarchically ordered, and an individual prefers a partner
of higher status to one of lower status, independent of the individuals own status. Class or
caste are a possible examples. Horizontal di¤erentiation occurs when an individual prefers
a partner of his/her own group linguistic, regional or religious identity are cases in point.
These two cases turn out to have very di¤erent implications.
To model horizontal heterogeneity, let there be two groups or regions, 1 and 2: Let H be
the payo¤ to an individual from matching with someone from the same region, and L be the
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payo¤ from matching with someone from a di¤erent region. Suppose that gender preferences
are the same across regions. The equilibrium sex ratio will be the same in both regions,
and in a stable match, there will be no inter-regional marriages. Now suppose that region
1 has large gender bias, while region 2 has no gender bias. In the absence of inter-regional
marriages, the sex ratio in region 1 will be r1 < 1. In the absence of population growth,
the sex ratio in region 2 will be 1. A male of quality "1 = F (1   r1) is available to any
woman in region 2, and the woman with the greatest incentive to make this match is the
one with the lowest quality,  = 0: Her payo¤ from making this match is " 1+L, while her
payo¤ from matching within her own region is H : Thus the imbalance in region 1 must be
large enough to o¤set the payo¤ di¤erence H   L; before any inter-regional marriages take
place.23 If there is population growth, then there will be an excess supply of girls in region 2,
and those of the lowest quality will marry the lowest quality boys from region 1. However,
inter-regional marriages yield small gains in utility, since both parties to the marriage get
a payo¤ only of L; and therefore, the e¤ects of ex ante selection decisions will be small.
This discussion has empirical relevance in the context of the last column of Table 1, which
shows the di¤erence between actual and required number of boys across the regions of India.
The surplus in the North West (10.7 boys per 100 girls) is counterbalanced by the decit in
the South (-11.2), the East (-8.8) and the West (-8.0). Given the large cultural di¤erences
between the South and the North-West, there is likely to be limited gains from trade, but
there may be more possibilities with regard to the East or West.
Vertical di¤erentiation is qualitatively di¤erent, since inter-group marriages will have
large utility consequences for one party. To model this, assume that there are n classes (or
castes), where 1 indexes the highest class and n the lowest. Let i be the measure of class i;
which is assumed to be increasing with i; so that we have a pyramidal society. Assume, for
simplicity, that the value from being matched does not vary across boys and girls, but does
depend upon the status of the partner. Let i be the value from being matched to a partner
of class i; where i 2 f1; 2; :::; ng: Assume also that the preference parameters are identical
across the two classes, and satisfy uB   uG > 2c and uB + i+1 < uG + i; where n+1  0;
since n is the lowest class.24 For simplicity, we assume that the idiosyncratic component of
match value is absent. This allows us to solve for an equilibrium recursively, from the upper
class to the lower class. For the highest class, the equilibrium sex ratio, r1; is less than 1
and satises the indi¤erence condition
23This assumes non-transferable utility. With transferable utility, the condition for inter-regional marriage
is more stringent "1 must be greater than 2(H   L).
24We may allow our utility parameters (uB ; uG and c) to be indexed by class the equations that follow
also apply with the appropriate indexation. However, some of the qualitative results  the comparisions
across classes depend on the parameters not being too di¤erent across classes.
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uB + r

1
1 + (1  r1)2   2c = uG + 1:
Now suppose that the sex ratio has been determined in all classes j  i; and that the sex
ratio in class i is ri  1: A measure 1 r

i
1+ri
i of class i boys are available, and if the sex ratio
in class i + 1 is ri+1; the measure of girls in this class is
ri+1
1+ri+1
i+1; and each such girl has
a probability pi+1(ri; ri+1) =
(1+ri+1)(1 ri )i
ri+1(1+ri )i+1
of marrying a boy from the higher class. This
leaves a measure
h
ri+1
1+ri+1
i+1   1 r

i
1+ri
i
i
of class i + 1 girls who are matched with a measure
i+1
1+ri+1
of class i + 1 boys, and let ~ri+1(ri; ri+1) denote the ratio of these two measures. The
payo¤ to boys of class i+ 1 is given by
U i+1(ri+1; r

i ) = uB + ~ri+1(ri; r

i+1)
i+1 + [1  ~ri+1(ri; ri+1)]i+2:
The payo¤ to lower class girls is given by
V i+1(ri+1; r

i ) =
(
uG + p
i+1(ri; r

i+1)
i + [1  pi+1(ri; ri+1)]i+1 if ~ri+1  1
uG + p
i+1(ri; r

i+1)
i + [1  pi+1(ri; ri+1)][i+2 + 1~ri+1 (i+1   i+2)] if ~ri+1  1
:
The equilibrium sex ratio ri+1; is determined as follows. If jU i+1(1; ri )  V i+1(1; ri )j is
less than 2c; then ri+1 = 1: Otherwise, r

i+1 is such that
U i+1(ri+1; r1)  V I+1(ri+1; r1) = 2c:
Note that ri+1  1 if i+1 is su¢ ciently large relative to i:
We have therefore solved recursively for the equilibrium sex ratio, starting from the
highest class. Note that r2 > r

1; that is the sex ratio is more favorable to girls in the second
class as compared to the highest class. This arises since the imbalance in the sex ratio
amongst the topmost class increases the payo¤ to lower class girls (since they can marry
up), while reducing the payo¤ to lower class boys (for any value of r2; the probability that
a lower class boy gets a partner increases with r1). More generally, r

i+1 is decreasing in r

i :
Now suppose that i   i+1 is constant for all i < n; so that the increment from marrying
up is constant across classes. Since r2 > r

1; this implies that the incentive to have a girl is
weaker in class 3 as compared to class 2, so that r3 < r

2; so one has an oscillating pattern of
the equilibrium sex ratio. Finally, if the cost of not marrying is large relative to any payo¤
gain from marrying up, i.e. if n  n 1   n; then the incentive to have a girl is strong in
the lowest class since boys there cannot marry down. Thus rn will be larger than the sex
ratio in other classes.
The basic nding, that incentives for having boys are higher in the upper classes, is
relevant for empirical work, suggesting that one should observe more male biased sex ratios
in the higher classes or castes, as compared to the lower ones. This is consistent with census
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data from India  the sex ratio in the lowest castes (the scheduled castes and scheduled
tribes) are more female friendly than in the rest of the population. They are also consistent
with data from the 1931 Indian census, the last census for which detailed caste based sex
ratios at all levels are available. More recently, Portner (2009) uses survey data on the
fertility decisions of married women from Indias National Family Health Surveys in order
to estimate the hazard rate for sex selective abortions. He nds that selection is restricted
to women with eight years of schooling. Since education is highly correlated with caste and
economic status, this is consistent with our theoretical predictions, although education could
also directly a¤ect the access to selection technologies.
From a welfare point of view, note that parental sex selection reduces ex ante expected
utility in the upper most class, under similar assumptions as in our simple model (i.e. if
uG   uB + 2c + 2(1   2) > 0). More interesting is the e¤ect on the lower classes, since
selection in the class above raises the payo¤s to girls, while lowering the payo¤ to boys. A
benchmark case is when ri = 1; in some lower class i > 1, so that there is no selection in this
class. If 2i > i+1 + i 1; then the benet to a girl who marries up is less than the cost to
the consequent lower class boy who fails to nd a partner in class i: So sex selection reduces
welfare also in the lower class. Suppose now that ri < 1: In this case, negative welfare e¤ects
are aggravated, since selection in the lower class reduces welfare, as in the simple model. We
conclude that sex selection reduces welfare also in the lower classes, on the assumption that
parameter values are such that there is no selection for girls in these classes. 25
Our results here are di¤erent from those obtained by Edlund (1999), who examines the
consequence of sex selection in nite society where every individual is strictly ordered by
rank, rank being endowed ex ante. She nds that if sex selection is perfect, then the sex
ratio will be balanced, with boys being chosen by high ranked individuals. Imbalances in
the sex ratio can only arise with noisy selection, where parents can only choose boys (or
girls) with some probability p 2 (0:5; 1); and this imbalance increases with son preference:
In contrast, we nd that aggregate sex ratios can be unbalanced even when selection is
perfect and costless (c = 0); due to the fact that each class has a large number of ex ante
homogeneous agents. We are also able to analyze the welfare implications of selection, and
unbalanced sex ratios in this context.
25If parameter values are such that there is selection for girls, then it is possible for sex selection to be
welfare increasing for the lower classes.
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5 Fertility, family composition and selection
Parents normally have more than one child, and their relative preferences between a boy
and girl are likely to depend upon the gender composition of their existing children. The
desire to have grandchildren is also likely to display an element of diminishing returns. To
model these considerations, consider a family with m boys and f girls. Abstracting from
marriage market considerations, let the utility to the parents be given by U(m; f); where
U(:) is strictly concave. In particular, assume that for any given family size n; U(m+1; n 
m  1) U(m;n m) is strictly decreasing in m: This assumption implies that the incentive
to select for boys will be greater in families where the rst (or rst few children) are girls
than where the rst child (or children) are boys. This is consistent with the ndings of Jha
et al. (2006), who use a survey of 1.1 million Indian households. They nd that the sex ratio
is more biased against girls if the rst or rst two children are girls, than if they are boys.
Assume, for simplicity, that family size is exogenously given at n > 1:Many demographers
argue that parents in East/South Asia have a strong preference for at least one boy, and
that this preference underlies gender based stopping rules, such stopping after the rst boy.
To model this, let us assume that
U(1; n  1)  U(0; n) > 2c;
so that the marginal utility of a boy exceeds that of a girl when you already have n  1
girls by a margin that is larger than c, abstracting from considerations of reproductive value.
Assume also that
jU(m+ 1; n m  1)  U(m;n m)j < 2c if m > 0:
This implies that if a family has one or more boys, then it does not have an incentive to
select for boy (abstracting from considerations of reproductive value). Nor does it have any
incentive to select for girls, at any point.
We now turn to marriage market considerations. Let (`) be the value to the parent
from having ` children matched, where  is increasing and strictly concave. Let utility be
perfectly transferable, and let t(r) denote the transfer from boys to girls, where t(1) = 0
and t(r) is continuous and decreasing in r: Suppose that the sex ratio is su¢ ciently close
to 1 so that the reproductive value of a family of any composition is approximately equal
to (n); independent of family gender composition, and t(r) is close to zero. Under these
assumptions, it follows that the optimal strategy is to not select, only at the last birth, and
if all n 1 previous births have been girls. The sex ratio corresponding to families following
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this strategy is given by r(n):
r(n) =
(0:5)n 1 fn 1
2n
g+ 1  (0:5)n 1
(0:5)n 1 fn+1
2n
g+ 1  (0:5)n 1 : (10)
As n increases, r(n) tends to 1, since it becomes increasingly unlikely that all n draws
result in a girl. We get the following table for values of r(n):
Table 2
n 2 3 4 5 6
r 0:714 0:909 0:957 0:987 0:995
Table 2 shows that r is very close to 1 (with only 5 missing women per 1000 male
population) when n = 6: It declines as n falls, and the decline accelerates. By n = 3;
there are 90 missing women, and at n = 2; there are almost 300 missing women. Thus, the
existence of preferences of this sort gives rise to a positive relation between fertility and the
sex ratio, and the claim that declines in family size such as under the one child policy in
China have aggravated sex ratio imbalances, in the presence of selection.
However, this analysis abstracts completely from considerations of the marriage market.
As n declines, the sex ratio declines as well, so that reproductive value diverges considerably
from (n); depending on family composition. Furthermore, if r declines, girls will be able to
get a more favorable household allocation, and this will be internalized by the parents. We
now take these factors into account. Suppose that r  1; so that girls are matched for sure,
while each boy is matched with independent probability r: The total payo¤ from selection
at the last birth is given by
U(1; n  1) + r[(n) + (n  2)t(r)] + (1  r)[(n  1) + (n  1)t(r)]  2c:
That is, with probability r the boy gets matched, and the total payo¤ is (n) plus the
transfer corresponding to n   2 girls (since the negative transfer of the boys o¤sets that of
one of the girls). With probability r; the payo¤ is (n   1) plus n   1 transfers. Since the
payo¤ from keeping a girl is given by U(0; n) + (n) + nt(r); the payo¤ gain from selection
is given by
[U(1; n  1)  U(0; n)]  2t(r))  (1  r)[(n)  (n  1) + t(r)]  2c: (11)
Let r(n) be the value of r such that (11) equals zero. Since the expression in (11) is
increasing in r; selection is optimal at the last birth for r r(n) and non-selection is optimal
if this inequality is reversed. Thus the equilibrium sex ratio r(n) is given by
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Sex ratio,
r
Fertility, n
ř
ŕ
r(n) = maxfr(n); r(n)g:
Fig. 1 graphs the functions r(n) and r(n); where the equilibrium r(n) is given by the
higher of these two curves, and is depicted by an unbroken line. Since r is an increasing
function while r is a decreasing function, there exists a critical value ~n such that r =r for
n  ~n and r = r for n > ~n: That is, to the right of ~n; families select at the last child if all
previous ones are girls, and this is optimal since the consequent sex ratio r is such that (11)
is strictly positive, given that r > r: To the left of ~n; if families select at the last child if
all previous ones are girls, this will not be optimal the consequent sex ratio r is such that
(11) is strictly negative, given that r < r: Thus only some families select, while others do
not, and the sex ratio r is such that both these yield the same payo¤. This implies that the
e¤ect of family size on the sex ratio in not monotone. A fall in family size initially reduces
the sex ratio, but further declines will tend to increase the sex ratio.
Consider now the implications of heterogeneity in family size in the population, with
some families having n1 children and others having n2 children, n2 > n1: Suppose that n1
and n2 are both to the right of ~n: Then both types of families will select at the last child
if all previous ones are boys, and the aggregate sex ratio will equal r(n1) + (1   ) r(n2)
where  is the population weight of families with size n1; and will therefore lie in the open
interval (r(n1); r(n2)):The sex ratio will be more biased towards boys in smaller families,
since they are more likely to exercise selection.
Now suppose that n1 and n2 are both small, i.e. less than ~n: The analysis here is quite
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di¤erent from the previous scenario. The aggregate sex ratio must lie in the closed interval
[r(n2); r(n1)] there is a range of parameter values such that the sex ratio is exactly r(n2);
and similarly, a range of parameter values such that it is exactly r(n1) : Suppose that  is
small, so that a large fraction of the population has size n2: In this case, if the indi¤erence
condition is satised for families of size n2; the sex ratio within this group can be any number
in the interval [r(n2); 1], where r(n2) < r(n2): Thus we can have (1  )r(n2) +  = r(n2);
where   1 is the fraction of these families selecting, if  is small, and at this sex ratio,
the smaller families will not select. Similarly, if  is large, then the sex ratio will be r(n1);
where a fraction of of the smaller families will be selecting while the larger families all select.
For intermediate values of ; the sex ratio will lie in the interval (r(n2); r(n1)); where large
families have a strict incentive to select and have sex ratio r(n2); while small families have
no incentive to select and have sex ratio 1. Thus, larger families have a more male biased sex
ratio than smaller families when n1 and n2 are both small, whereas the previous paragraph
shows that smaller families have a more male biased sex ratio when both n1 and n2 are large.
Our analysis can be used to analyze the implications of the one-child policy in China. It
has been argued that the one-child policy has aggravated sex selection in China see, for
example, Hesketh et al. (2006).26 This argument is based purely on temporal and spatial
coincidence between the policy and sex ratios. The policy was introduced in 1978, and the
sex ratio has moved against girls since. However, this is about the time that new technologies
for sex selection became available. Secondly, sex selection appears to be greater in urban
areas, where the one-child policy is more rigorously enforced, than in rural areas, where
enforcement is more lax. Here again, urban areas have superior medical facilities, so that
selection may be easier than in rural areas. Furthermore, the urban areas are also richer
than the poorer areas, and the ability of richer boys to marry down would imply that the
incentive to select may be greater in urban areas, as our discussion in section 4 demonstrates.
In consequence, it is hard to infer causality from these correlations.
Our analysis suggests that while the e¤ect of fertility decline upon the sex ratio may
be unambiguous when fertility is large, it may not make the sex ratio more male biased
at low family sizes. Intuitively, when parents have many girls, the incentive to select for a
boy is stronger, due to diminishing "marginal utility" for girls, and since the girls ensure
grandchildren when r < 1:
26These arguments have been made mainly in medical journals, but more extreme versions of the same
argument are very prevalent in the press. For example, Eric Baculinao of NBC News (Baculinao, 2004)
writes: The age-old bias for boys, combined with Chinas draconian one-child policy imposed since 1980,
has produced what Gu Baochang, a leading Chinese expert on family planning, described as "the largest,
the highest, and the longest" gender imbalance in the world.
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6 Societies without generalized gender bias
Our analysis may also be applied to societies without generalized gender bias, such as the
UK or the US, where sex selection could be used for family balancing reasons. In the UK, the
Human Fertilization and Embryology Authority recommended against allowing sex selection
for "social reasons" (including family balancing).27 The American Society of Reproductive
Medicine is more positive : "If ow cyclometry or other methods of preconception gender
selection are found to be safe and e¤ective, physicians should be free to o¤er preconcep-
tion gender selection in clinical settings to couples who are seeking gender variety in their
o¤spring..." (May 2001).
While there is unease in o¢ cial circles with allowing sex selection, there is considerable
evidence that many parents have a desire for gender balance within the family. US census
data for 1980 and 1990 shows that women with two children are 6% more likely to have a
third child if the children are of the same gender (Angrist and Evans, 1998). The probability
of a third child is slightly greater (1-2%) if the two children are girls rather than boys. This
suggests that gender balancing is a primary concern, but also that the sexes are not treated
completely symmetrically. Dahl and Moretti (2008) present suggestive evidence that parents
in the US, especially men, prefer boys to girls. 28
To examine these issues, we adapt the model of gender preferences based on family
composition. For simplicity, suppose that family size is xed exogenously at two. Focus
attention on the subsection of the population that is willing to select. To reect preferences
for gender balancing, assume that in this group, U(1; 1) U(2; 0) > 2c and U(1; 1) > U(0; 2);
but that this di¤erence may or may not exceed 2c: Thus we allow for the possibility that
preferences are not completely symmetric across genders, i.e. there is an element of bias (our
analysis obviously applies, with minor modication, if the bias is reversed):29
For reasons of space, we do not present analytical results here, and refer the reader
to the discussion paper version of this paper. In the case where preferences are relatively
symmetric, so that U(1; 1) U(0; 2) also exceeds 2c; the overall equilibrium will be one where
every family in the group that may select has one boy and one girl, and thus the overall sex
27The UK allows sex selection for genetic reasons, when there is the risk of gender specic genetic disorders.
28They nd that women with rst born daughters are less likely to marry, and also more likely to divorce
if married, than women whose rst born is a son. Interestingly, shot-gun marriage is more likely if the child
in utero is a boy, and the mother has an ultrasound. They also nd that if the rst birth is a daughter,
this increases the expected number of children. Abrevaya (2009) nds evidence of biased sex ratios in Asian
families in the US.
29Asymmetries can also arise for technological reasons. Sperm separation techniques are currently more
e¤ective for selecting for girls than boys, so that the e¤ective cost of selection could di¤er across the sexes.
Our analysis would also apply if there were di¤erences in the costs of selection rather than di¤erences in
gender specic utilities.
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ratio will be balanced. In this case, there are no externalities associated with the selection
decision, and allowing selection for family balancing raises welfare. On the other hand, if
U(1; 1)   U(2; 0) < 2c; the equilibrium will be one where the sex ratio r is less than one.
The equilibrium is ine¢ cient and social welfare can be increased by moving towards a more
balanced sex ratio. If the overall gains from family balancing are small relative to the cost
of selection, then is e¢ cient not to permit selection. However, if the overall gains are large,
then it is e¢ cient to encourage selection also by families whose rst child is a girl, so that
this balances the sex ratio.
7 Conclusions
This papers main contribution is a model of the equilibrium sex ratio when parents can
choose the gender of their child. This allows us to examine the welfare consequences of
selection. If gender bias is large, parental choice results in too many boys, and reduces
welfare. Conversely, if intrinsic gender bias is mild or absent, and the observed preference
for boys is due to the excess supply of girls due to the marriage squeeze, selection may
increase welfare. Our results are robust in many ways; they hold if household allocations
or parental investments are inuenced by the sex ratio, in a continuous way. We have also
examined the e¤ects of sex ratio imbalances on gender di¤erences in parental investments in
children. Our analysis of the e¤ect of fertility and family size upon equilibrium sex ratios is
relevant in the context of the decline in fertility in East/South Asia, especially China. We
believe that the model provides a useful framework to examine a host of issues related to
sex ratios.
8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: We show that the global welfare optimum corresponds to r = 1
under assumption A1. At r < 1; the derivative of welfare is given by
W 0(r)jr<1 = (uG + G + 2c  uB) +

1  r + r


(B + E()) +

1  1

  r
2

E(j  ):
Since the rst term in brackets is strictly positive, it su¢ ces to show that the second
and third terms is positive. Since E("j"  ") is bounded above by "; and "  0; a su¢ cient
condition for these to be positive is
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(B + E())
"
 r +    
2
 ((1  r) + r) :
Since the right hand side above is less than 1

; the inequality is satised under A1.
Consider now the derivative at r > 1 :
W 0(r)jr>1 = (uG+2c uB B) 
1
r

1

+
r
2
  1

(G+E("))+
1
r

1  r + r


E(j  ):
Since the rst term in brackets is strictly negative, it su¢ ces to show that the sum of the
remaining terms is negative. This reduces to the condition
G + E(")
E(j  )  
(1  r) + r
 + r   2 (12)
A1 states that  + 1 > 2; so the denominator on the right hand side of (12) is positive.
The derivative of the right hand side of (12) with respect to r is negative, and so if the
inequality is satised for r = 1; it is also satised for all larger values of r: Thus the critical
condition is
G + E(")
E(j  ) 

 + 1  2 ;
which is ensured by A1.
Proofs relating to section 2:
We show rst that t(x) is decreasing in x: Di¤erentiating (4) we obtain
dt
dx
=
0(x)(  t)  0(x)(+ (t)
(+ i) + ( + i)0(t)
< 0;
since  is decreasing in x and  is increasing.
To show that the match e¢ ciency term is maximized at x = 1; dene
M 0(x)  (1  ) ~U 0(x) +  ~V 0(x):
Di¤erentiating the expressions for ~U and ~V and using condition (4):
M 0(x) =
0(+ i) + (1  )0( + i)
(+ i)( + i)2
(  t) +


i(+ i)
0(t)  (1  )
i( + i)

t0(x):
At x = 1, 0 =  0,  =  and  = 1
2
; so the rst term equals zero. Since 0(0) = 1; the
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second term is also zero.
Proof relating to section 3:
The second order condition for the optimality of xB is
1
r
Z "
"
1
g3(("))

g2(("))f 0(")  1
r
f 2(")g
0
(("))

d"  f 0(")(B + xG)  c
00
B(x

B) < 0:
We assume that this su¢ cient condition is satised. There is an open set of distributions
such that this condition holds. If f(:) and g(:) are both uniform, the condition reduces
to  c00B(xB) < 0; which follows from the strict convexity of the cost function. Thus if the
distributions are close to being uniform,the condition will hold. Furthermore, if r = 1 and
f = g; then the condition also reduces to  c00B(xB) < 0 (the second term f 0(")(B + xG) is
absent in this case). A similar argument applies to the su¢ cient condition for girls, where
the second term is absent.
Proof of proposition 3: Equation (9) shows that xG is a continuous function of r for all
r 2 [0; 1]. Equation (8) shows that xB is a continuous function of r for all r 2 [0; 1] as
long as f(:) is continuous at zero (since f(:) is assumed to be continuous on its support):
Thus the payo¤ di¤erence between boys and girls, ~h(r) = ~U(r)  ~V (r)  2c; is a continuous
function of r: If ~h(1)  0; then r = 1 is an equilibrium since we have assumed that there
is weak son preference so that ~U(1)   ~V (1) is non-negative. If ~h(1) > 0, then since ~h(0) =
uB   uG   G   "   2c < 0; the intermediate value theorem ensures that there is a value
r 2 (0; 1) such that ~h(r) = 0: If f(") ! k > 0 as " # 0; then equation (8) shows that
xB increases discontinuously as r changes from 1 to a value below one. The size of this
jump is proportional to f(0) since "! 0 as r ! 1; and f(:) is continuous on its support.
Since ~h(1) > 0; limr"1 ~h(r) will also be strictly positive as long as f(0) is su¢ ciently small.
The analysis in the text of the paper proves the welfare results, and that (quasi-symmetric)
equilibrium is unique.
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